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arrows and given, as well as taken, good measure in the 
area of trade. No one is more candid, I think, in 
presenting the u.S. perspective on this issue and has done 
more for U.S. interests without, however, losing sight of 
the fact that we, the United States, are in the game over 
the long run, and insofar as the rest of the world 
prospers, so do we. 
It gives me great pleasure to present to you 
Ambassador Clayton Yeutter. 
MR. YEUTTER: Thank you, Bruce.- That was a 
very gracious introduction and much appreciated. I must 
say to you and your associates and colleagues here at 
Brookings that you are deserving of commendations and 
accolades for putting on this kind of program. It is 
an important issue, and I am very pleased that you and 
your institution have focused on it. 
I am going to speak for twenty minutes or so on 
the issue and then open up for questions for whatever 
period of time we have. Bruce, please cut it off whenever 
you feel it is appropriate and desirable to do so. 
I have not had a chance to get briefed on all 
the comments that have been made today. I have heard 
some of them. I will respond to a few of those in my 
presentation, but I would be happy to address others in 
the discussion later this evening, if necessary and if 
275 .. 
anybody would like to raise them. 
2 First of all, I would like to set at rest any 
3 reservations that anybody has about the importance of 
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these negotiations and any doubts that our friends in 
Canada have about the u.s. attitude toward these negotia-
tions. There has been some commentary to the effect that 
the United States, really, has not taken the negotiations 
serious or at least has not put a sufficiently high 
I 9 
2S 
~ 10 
priority on them. I don't happen to agree with any of 
that. That certainly has not been my view at any time. 
11 I certainly have not indicated that viewpoint to anybody 
12 in the government of Canada or to anybody in the private 
13 sector of Canada, and I have never, never indicated that 
14 viewpoint in any speech that I have made to any group in 
lS the United States. 
16 So, we do take it seriously. We do consider 
17 it a high priority. I have been saying that for 19 months 
18 so I hope somebody pays attention on that issue. 
19 I happen to think that it is the most important 
20 bi-lateral negotiation this country has ever had, and I 
21 have said that probably 300 times in speeches over the 
22 last 19 months. I hope that due attention is paid to 
23 that now as a result of this evening's festivities. 
24 I truly believe that. 
25 We have an opportunity in this negotiation to 
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open the borders between the United States and Canada 
and provide enormous economies of scale to the business 
firms of both countries that can provide competitive 
benefits to both, internationally, of immense proportions. 
That is the basic value of these negotiations, and that 
ought to be recognized by anyone who has any experience 
in business. Canadian business firms will benefit in a 
whole variety of ways from bhese negotiations because of 
the extension of markets that will be obtained in the 
United States and because of the economies of scale that 
will result from that, and American firms will benefit 
as well. 
I don't happen to believe that American firms I 
I 
,will benefit nearly as much as Canadian firms, but that isl 
not important. The fact is that both countries are going 
to be significant beneficiaries. This is not a zero-sum 
game where somebody wins and somebody loses. This is 
an ideal situation where both countries will be benefi-
ciaries. 
Now, not every firm in both countries will 
benefit and not every industry in both countries will 
benefit. There will unquestionably be structural 
adjustment involved in this kind of an arrangement, but 
that is to be expected. That is a part of growth and 
evolution in capitalistic society, irrespective of whether 
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1 or not we have free trade arrangements. You go through 
2 that in Canada; we go through that in the United States, 
3 inevitably. And, this may accelerate that to some degree 
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in some areas, but so be it. I happen to think that is 
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a strength and a pervayer of vitality, rather than a 
weakness and a detriment to the negotiations. I happen 
to think it is very clearly in the economic self interest 
of both Canada and the United States to complete the 
I 9 
~ 
free trade arrangement. 
~ 10 h Beyond the bi-lateral benefits and the self 
11 interest that is involved to the United States and Canada 
12 as nations, it seems to me that there is also a multi-
13 lateral benefit. I happen to believe that if we do this 
14 job well and if we truly open border between these two 
lS major trading nations -- and I am convinced that we can 
16 do precisely that -- I believe that will set an excellent 
17 example for the rest of the world. To me, that is 
18 constructive bi-lateralism, and that is the kind of bi-
19 lateralism that fosters and facilitates multi-lateralism. 
20 It sets an example for the rest of the world in opening 
21 markets and in providing freer and more open trade. That 
22 is the kind of bi-lateralism that is commendable in the 
23 
world today. I don't see that as detracting from multi-
24 
lateralism; I see that as contributing to multi-laterali 
2S 
and showing the way and in doing so at a propicious time 
278 
1 in the context of multi-lateral challenges. Or, putting 
2 it another way, it will set an example for the Uruguay 
3 Round of the MTN. We will go through a lot of skirmishing 
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in the MTN this year, meaning 1987 at a time when, hope-
fully, we will bringing the U.S.-Canada negotiations to 
a conclusion. 
If then we get to very serious negotiations in 
Geneva in the MTN in 1988 -- as I believe we will and in 
I 9 some areas even in 1987 -- what we achieve in the U.S.-
~ 
~ 10 
~ Canada free trade arrangement can clearly· provide not only 
11 an example but perhaps even a model for some of the 
12 negotiations in Geneva and in the Uruguay Round. 
13 Well, enough on the importance of this exercise 
14 and the value to the two countries. 
15 Let's be a bit more mundane now and speak a bit 
16 about the process itself in the negotiations. As all of 
17 you know, the fast-track authority for this process 
18 expires January 1 or January 3, I believe it is, of 1988, 
19 which means, as a practical matter, if we are to present 
20 this agreement to the United States Congress in a timely 
21 way, we would need to reach final agreement by somewhere 
22 around October 1. That means that we have a significant 
23 
negotiating challenge ahead of us between now and October 
24 
one because that is not a lot of time, and we have a lot 
25 
of issues on the plate. 
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But I am not in any way intimidated by that 
2 time schedule. I hope our friends in Canada -- particul 
3 in the government of Canada -- are not intimidated by 
0 
25 4 that time schedule. I think we can meet that, from our 
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standpoint, and I hope it can be met from i:.the standpoint 
of Canada. 
We have a whole host of working groups on an 
inter-agency basis which have been functioning here for 
I 9 quite some time, as you well know. I am sure that a 
25 
~ 10 similar organization prevails in Canada .. Those are all 
11 at work. We have had to wait on tariffs, at least, for 
12 the advice of the U.S. International Commission before 
13 we could move forward in an active way. That advice is 
14 now available to us. We are prepared to move forward in 
lS a an aggressive way with the tariff negotiation, and we 
16 are prepared to move forward very soon on everything else. 
11 If we can do what Peter Murphy and his friends 
18 here in the U.S. have set out to do and what hopefully 
19 Simon Reisman and his friends in Canada have set out to do 
20 then T am convinced that we can pull it all together by 
21 October I or thereabouts. We have a comprehensive agenda 
22 here in the united States. We have a lot that we would 
23 like to get accomplished, but I don't see any reason why 
24 we cannot do so. 
2S I am told that there was some concern expressed 
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here today about the inadequacies of consultations here in 
the united States, both with the Congress and with the 
private sector. I don't happen to agree with 
I would like to embellish that. I don't know 
that, either 1· 
where that , 
criticism is arising. I think it has come from some of 
the people who have made presentations today, but I would 
like to just comment on both of those factors. 
My first general comment is that it seems to me 
that all of us ought to be cognizant of the time that is 
involved in the consultation process. Putting it another 
way, I don't think that we ought to have our negotiators 
trotting over to Capitol Hill, consulting with Members of 
Congress unless they have something to consult about. I 
don't think we ought to be calling members of our private 
sector into Washington or anywhere else to have consul-
tations with them unless we have something worth talking 
about. 
These are busy people. At least, I hope they 
are busy people. They claim they are sufficiently busy. 
They say they ought to have a raise that is being voted on 
today or tomorrow. I happen to share the view that they 
ought to have that raise, but that is not quite relevant 
to the issue here tonight. 
I don't want people, including my own people, 
to come in and consult with me unless they have something 
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worthwhile to say, and I don't believe that we ought to 
2 take up the time of Members of Congress or take up the 
3 time of people in the private sector who are attempting 
~ ..... 4 to earn a living unless we have got something to say . 
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The fact of the matter is that we have been 
going through a skirmishing phase of these negotiations 
over the last several months, and there hasn't been a lot 
to say on either side. Now that we are getting down to 
I 9 business, as hopefully we will, in an intense way between 
2S 
~ 10 now and the first of October or thereabouts, there ought 
11 to be ample opportunities to consult and a lot to consult 
12 about. 
13 Let me make it very clear that we are 
14 appreciative of any input the Members of the U.S. Congress 
15 have to this process, and we are most appreciative of 
16 input corning from the private sector. And, we will listen 
17 I think I have done that, myself, all my lifetime, and I 
18 don't intend to change that modus operandi now. So, there 
19 will be ample consultations with the U.S. Congress, and 
20 there will be ample consultations with the U.S. private 
21 sector between now and the end of this exercise and we wil 
22 try to listen to everybody and finish with a work product 
23 that will be acceptable and marketable on Capitol Hill. 
24 Peter Murphy, clearly, shares that viewpoint, 
25 and I don't see any reason for further discussion of that 
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point. 
Apparently someone made the point here today, 
too, that there is a difference in 
Murphy on our side and Mr. Reisman 
rank between Ambassador I 
on the Canadian side, , 
or, at least, a difference in reporting, where, in our 
case Ambassador Murphy reports to me, and, in the Canadian 
case, presumably, Mr. Reisman reports, allegedly, directly 
to the Prime Minister. 
Well, I am not concerned about reporting 
responsibilities in Canada. As far as I am concerned, 
the government of Canada can organize its negotiations 
however it wishes. But I will say that I happen to think 
the Ambassador Murphy is a skillful negotiator. He may 
not be half as good as Simon Reisman and, therefore, we 
may end up with the short end of this negotiation, but I 
am prepared to take that chance. I will accept the 
responsibility for the ultimate work product, and if it 
turns out that way, then everybody in the United States 
, can castigate Ambassador Yeutter for the inadequacies of 
the negotiations. But let's wait and make that judgment 
when the exercise is finished and let's not do it now. 
It seems to me that at the beginning of a true 
negotiating process, it is not a desirable time to second 
guess the skills of the negotiator. Let's second guess 
the skills of the negotiators at the end of the process 
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1 and not now. 
2 with respect to the objectives of the agreement 
3 and I will not speak for Canada's objectives, obviously 
~ ....... 4 but from the standpoint of the United States I will say 
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that we would like to go farther with this agreement than 
we have with the U.S.-Israel agreement. That may be an 
ambitious undertaking, but I do not believe that it is 
an unrealistic undertaking. 
I 9 In particular, we would like to see that occur 
~ 
~ 10 in some of the areas that are of interest to us on an i 
11 
12 
international basis, as well as a bi-Iateral basis. These I 
include the kinds of topics that we gave a great deal of ! 
I 
13 emphasis to at Punte del Este, and we will do in the new 
14 GATT round and we hope that we will be joined by Canada 
15 in that regard. 
16 These are areas like intellectual property 
17 and services and investment, and those three in particular 
18 where there are major difficulties around the world and 
19 a lot of opportunities to improve the international 
20 trading system. We would like to see the U.S.-Canada 
21 agreement set an example and provide some models in all 
22 of those areas, and we hope that is achievable in the 
23 free trade arrangement. 
24 Agriculture also is a high priority to both of 
25 us in the new GATT round in Geneva. I know there has been' 
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considerable discussion on that issue here today and the 
2 question raised as to just how much can be achieved in 
3 agriculture bi-Iaterally. I would share that analysis 
U 
~ 4 because agriculture is a global problem. It is not a 
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U.S.-Canada preblem. There are only certain facets ef 
the agricultural situatien that can be dealt with effec-
tively bi-Iaterally or unilaterally by either ef our 
countries, and that clearly has to be built into the 
I 9 
~ 
~ 10 E-< 
negetiating exercise. 
But I am certainly net prepared-to. suggest that 
11 we can do nothing in agriculture in the U.S.-Canada 
12 negotiation" I happen to. think that we can do quite a 
13 let in some areas. There is no. reason_:.: why we can't take 
14 on the tariff issues that arise in agriculture. There is 
15 no reasen whey we can't deal with standards-kinds of 
16 questions, and certainly why we can't deal with any kinds 
17 of trade problems with agricutural products that are net 
18 likely to. be on the MTN agenda. I am thinking particularl 
19 , abeut specialty-kinds of crops which are unlikely to. be 
20 negetiated to any great degree in Geneva. 
21 So., let's try to. solve those problem and epen 
22 the berders in those areas between the United States and 
23 Canada in the free trade arrangement, if we can. 
24 What I would call the big-ticket items, such as 
25 
grains, clearly are multi-lateral in scope, and it seems 
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to me that there we are going to have to await the resul ts I 
I 
of Uruguay Round,and whateve r those happen to be, we 
ought to fold them into the free trade arrangement at a , 
later date. I see no reason why we can'tnake that kind ofl 
an institutional accommodation on both sides of the borderj 
With respect to other issues -- non-tariff 
measures, a number of automobile issues, all the tariff 
items -- we clearly have major objectives in all of these 
areas, and I hope we can achieve them. I assume that 
Canada has major objectives in these same areas, and I 
hope Canada can achieve its objectives with us. I 
Clearly, we are talking about a program that will 
1,1 phase in over a period of years. Neither the United 
States or Canada is going to make major changes overnight > 
in most of these areas. 
U.S.-Israel arrangement. 
i 
We used a ten-year program in the! 
I suspect that something of that! 
nature will emerge in this one, as well. 
Then, perhaps, just a comment on the question of 
unfair trade practices and how they will be handled. It 
seems to be a priority of the Government of Canada to 
discuss the issue of subsidy and counter-vailing duty 
laws and anti-dumping laws. In particular, in the united 
States, as a part of this negotiation, as far as I am 
concerned, those are proper subjects for discussion. 
I have indicated over and over again that in 
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my judgment we ought to have everything on the table in 
2 the U.S.-Canada negotiation. We are prepared to have 
3 everything on the table, if Canada is. So, I would hope 
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that the Government of Canada would respond in kind, and 
let's discuss everything. 
What we can do that makes sense in that area is 
another matter because I don't believe we~nt to finish 
this exercise with a result that in any way would foster 
I 9 
2S 
or stimulate the generation of unfair trade practices~ 
~ 10 h We ought to try to conclude this exercise with an outcome 
11 that will discourage unfair trade practices on both sides 
12 of the border. That is going to take some very creative 
13 thinking and creative negotiating. But we are prepared 
14 to listen to any suggestions or recommendations that are 
15 
16 
brought forth, either on this side of the border or on 
Canadian side of the border in that regard. 
the! 
, 
17 If we can provide some models for the world in 
18 this respect, let's develop some models and see where it 
19 , takes us. 
20 I would just make one analogy in that regard. 
21 That would be to our semi-conductor agreement with Japan, 
22 which at the moment is having its problems in implementati n, 
23 but that isn't to say that the concepts that are encompass d 
24 in that agreement are in any way unsound. One of the 
25 things that we have attempted to do in that semi-conductor 
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1 arrangement is to provide for what I would call "preventiv 
2 dumping." That is a system of handling the practices of 
3 firms in such a way that they are discouraged from dumping 
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rather than punished. It is preventive medicine, rather 
than curative medicine. 
If we can effectively discourage the dumping of 
semi-conductors by the Japanese, perhaps there are ways 
to use that model in this exercise or in others. It 
I 9 seems to me that, as in medicine so in trade, it is 
2S 
~ 10 better to prevent unfair trade practices than to come 
11 along and attempt to cure them. 
12 My final comment would relate to the general 
13 outlook for this exercise. Someone told me, as I walked 
14 in this evening, that there is a considerable amount of 
15 pessimism prevailing in this conference today about the 
16 likelihood of bringing this exercise to a successful 
11 conclusion. There seems to be a general consensus that it 
18 is a good idea and that we ought to have a free trade 
19 ,arrangement, but a lot of doubt as to whether it will ever 
20 come to pass. 
21 I don't know whether that is an accurate 
22 assessment or even if it is accurate for this group 
23 whether that accurately reflects the attitudes of the 
24 people of Canada or the people of the United States. 
25 I don't happen to believe that it does, here in 
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the United States, but I haven't taken any polls and so 
2 I can't provide definitive answers. 
3 All I would like to say on that subject is that 
~ ...... 4 I don't see any reason to be pessimistic about bringing 
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a good idea to fruition. We ought to be able to find 
the skills and the commitment and the determination within 
the governments on both sides of this border and within 
our respective private sectors to bring this about. 
I 9 
~ 
If it is really a sound idea -- and I am 
~ 10 E- convinced that it is -- then sound ideas ought to be 
II brought to fruition, and those of you who are in the room 
12 tonight who have a lot of leadership capabilities and 
13 leadership roles can join with those of us in government 
14 and hopefully will join -- to try to bring a positive 
15 outcome into effect by October 1, which is our deadline. 
16 I just don't believe in being pessimistic about 
17 exercises of this nature. This isn't to suggest that they 
18 are not difficult to achieve because a lot of things are 
19 difficult to achieve. Worthwhile things are usually 
20 difficult to achieve, but we ought to go about doing it. 
21 And, we ought to have the intensity of commitment to bring 
22 it about, and I am convinced that we can do so. 
23 Bruce, thank you very much. Let's go to some 
24 
questions. 
25 
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QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 
2 
3 MR. YEUTTER: As for questions, I will just 
0 
~ 4 
~ 5 
h .~ 
..... r:::Lf) 0:: .... 
~ .g'~ 6 
tI:j:S"? 
t> • ~ ...... :9 co 7 
~-6ti) 
~~o 
8 ~Q)~ 
h~ 
take them from here, Bruce, if that is alright with you. 
Please don't be bashful. 
PARTICIPANT: Mr. Ambassador, the suggestion has 
been made today that within the last two weeks there has 
been a new directive or a new push, presumably, from 
I 9 
~ 
your political masters to really advance and go more 
~ 10 aggressively after this free trade agreement. 
11 How do you respond to that? 
12 MR. YEUTTER: As far as I am concerned, the 
13 determination has always been there. I don't see any I 
I' 
14 
15 
difference today from two weeks ago. Clearly, Vice-
President Bush and Secretary of the Treasury Baker 
I 
I 
16 visited Japan at the invitation -- oh, "Japan," wow. You 
17 can tell what trade problems are on my mind at the moment. 
18 Semi-conductors are still in the back of my mind, as you 
19 can tell. 
20 Vice-President Bush and Secretary Baker visited 
21 Canada a few days ago at the invitation of your government 
22 but I don't see that as really having an impact on the 
23 environment .. Clearly, that was a positive visit. They 
24 were pleased to make that trip to Ottawa and to confirm 
25 
the commitment and the determination of the government of 
290 
the United States to move forward, but I don't see this 
2 as a new impetus or a new push. 
3 We were well involved in this process and moving. 
~ ..... 4 it along in what I believe to be an effective way prior 
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to that time, and we will continue to do so. 
PARTICIPANT: May I have a supplementary questio ? 
MR. YEUTTER: Certainly. 
PARTICIPANT: The New York Times the other day 
I 9 stated that you or the USTR Office has been more or less 
25 
~ 10 told not to put the Canadians on steel, . that a repitition 
11 of the lumber tariff, if applied to steel, would set off 
12 so many landmines for Prime Minister Mulroney, that it 
13 would torpedo the free trade talks. 
14 Has there been such a directive? Has there 
15 been an expression of symptoms }n that direction? 
16 MR. YEUTTER: There has not,but I would like to 
17 comment further. I have said over and over again that 
18 both Canada and the United States should separate the 
19 consideration &f short run issues from long run issues. 
20 I realize that is difficult to do and that 
21 people out in the country are not always prepared to do 
22 that, that there is inevitably some linkage, but we ought 
23 to try. That is an educational process in both Canada 
24 and the United States. The free trade arrangement is an 
25 exercise that, hopefully, will benefit both nations in 
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immeasurable and indispensible ways over the next half 
2 century or century. 
3 
~ .-...... 
invaluable 
I 
To suggest that this very necessary and 
negotiating exercise should in some way be held hostage 
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sensibie 
I 
I 
to individual bi-lateral trade problems, no matter how 
important they may be, just seems to me not to be a 
proposition. 
We ought to be able to overcome the temptation 
I 9 to tie an enormously valuable effort of this nature to 
~ 
~ 10 t-.. transitory trade problems that should be in some way 
11 disposed of by our two countries in a relatively short 
12 period of time. 
13 After all, if this is an exercise that will 
14 finish in 1987, be approved by both governments, say, in 
lS 1988, and then implemented over a period of ten to twelve 
16 years, we are talking about an agreement that will not 
11 fully go into effect until the year 2000. To suggest that 
18 what is happeningin 1987 on timber or steel ought to 
19 dissuade the two countries from moving forward with an 
20 agreement that will be beneficial to them both in the 
21 year 2000, I just find incomprehensible, and I hope thinki g 
22 people on both sides of the border will come to those 
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with difficult bi-Iateral trade problems of a temporary 
nature, whether they be softwood lumber or shakes and 
shingles or steel or anyone of a dozen issues. 
Let's deal with them one by one, try to resolve 
them as friends. We can deal with those kinds of question 
amicably. There is no reason why we should not be able I 
to do so. They may be difficult. They may be contentiousJ 
And they may have political implications on both sides of 
the border. But, nevertheless, we ought to be able to 
handle them as neighbors and as friends and finish those 
negotiating :exercises in such a way as to emerge as good 
or better friends than we were before. 
We have gone through a comparable kind of 
discussion with the European Community this last week with 
I 
I 
our so-called Article 24-6 negotiation on the accession 
of Spain and Portugal. The Community kept saying to me, 
"Ghee, you ought not rock the boat on this issue because 
we might be able to support an agricultural negotiation 
, in the new GATT round if you do." 
Well, the same analogy applies. The agricultura 
negotiation in the new GATT round is too important to in 
any way be linked to a 24-6 dispute over corn going into 
Spain. We are talking about an agricultural negotiation 
of great importance to the entire world and one that is 
going to set the environment in which agricultural trade 
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will be conducted over the next ten, twenty, or thirty 
2 years. To suggest that that ought to be put on hold 
3 because we are debating the trade damage of the accession 
~ 4 ...... 
uf 
of Spain to the EC, also seems incomprehensible to me . 
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Well, fortunately we settled that one, and 
fortunately I hope the agricultural negotiation in the 
new GATT round will proceed. I hope we can settle our 
disputes with the government of Canada on steel and every-
I 
25 
9 thing else and, likewise, proceed with the free trade 
:;r: 10 h arrangement. That, certainly, is our objective. 
11 But I don't believe it makes sense to have 
12 steel or any other issue fester during the time that this 
13 negotiation is underway. I don't believe that is in the 
14 interest of Canada, and I don't believe that is in the 
lS interest of the United States. 
16 I think the people of both countries deserve 
17 better than that. 
18 PARTICIPANT: You referred briefly to autornobil 
19 ,Mr. Ambassador. I wonder if you could elaborate a bit 
20 about the problems and the opportunities in that field. 
21 MR. MACLAURY: Could you repeat the question, 
22 please? 
23 MR. YEUTTER: Yes. The question was, what about 
24 automobiles and would I comment on the problems and 
2S 
opportunities in that area. 
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Well, I don't have any desire to get into any 
detail on that because I am not ready to get into detail 
on that. Not that I shy away from questions, as I hope 
you have recognized by now, but simply because that is a 
major item of trade between our two countries, as you well 
know, and is a very complicated issue. We have not 
mutually agreed at this point on how automobile issues 
will be dealt with in this negotiation. 
Suffice it to say that we intend to raise issues 
involving automobile trade with the government of Canada. 
Some of those issues have already been surfaced, the 
duty remission scheme being one that has had a lot of 
attention, not only within the Administration here or 
discussion within the Administration but also some 
attention on Capitol Hill by Mr. Dingel, Chairman of 
the Energy and COIT~erce Committee and others. 
Those are issues that cannot be swept aside and, 
in my judgment, should not be swept aside. So, there will 
be automobile issues that require discussion and debate 
in this exercise, but it is premature to come to any 
conclusions as to how they will be handled or what the 
ultimate outcome may be. 
MR. WEISS: Mr. AIT~assador, if I caught the 
I 
sens~ 
of our discussion today correctly, I think the pessimism I : 
was not so much about the ultimate outcome and feasibility' 
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of negotiating a free trade arrangement, as it was with 
regard to the feasibility of completing the job by 
October 1. In that respect, notice was taken that there 
are a lot of new issues, important issues, desirable 
issues, such as services but they are complicated issues 
and it may be very difficult to achieve anything 
substantive there. 
That raised the further question as to whether 
when we get to October 1 and the job isn't completed, what 
do we do at that point? 
MR. YEUTTER: Okay, good question. For those 
who might not have heard it, the issue is what do we do 
if we can't get this job done by October 1. There are a 
lot of complex issues to deal with in the negotiations 
between now and then. If we just simply can't get them 
resolved by October 1, what then is to happen? 
Well, I can't speak for either government, 
obviously, because we are dealing with a hypothetical 
,question, and both governments will obviously appraise the 
situation at that point in time and make a decision as to 
where to go beyond that. 
My judgment would be -- again, based upon my 
earlier comments -- that this is too important an exercise 
to simply punt at that point in time, so if we just 
couldn't get it done, we ought to try to extend the time 
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available, which would mean that we would have to get an 
2 extension of the fast-track authority here in the U.S. in 
3 order to do so. 
~ ..... 4 I would rather not go that route. I would 
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prefer that we try to meet that timetable, but we will 
evaluate all aspects of the situation on October 1, if 
that be a necessity . 
Whether the Congress would be prepared to give 
us additional fast-track authority at that time remains 
~ 
~ 10 h 
to be seen. That would probably depend very much on 
11 what the potential outcome looked like at that moment in 
12 time. In o~her words, that would have to be a static 
13 evaluation based upon the conditions that existed on 
14 October 1. 
15 But if major progress was being made and there 
16 were a few· loose ends that remained to be wrapped up, I 
17 would assume that the U.S. Congress would grant fast-
18 track authority to go beyond the October 1 date. 
19 My experience, though, as a negotiator -- and 
20 this would be the caveat to that is that negotiations 
21 usually go as fast as they need to go. If one extends 
22 the time by a year, then people will mark time for another 
23 12 months, and you will still run into the deadline. That 
24 seems to be the experience in most bi-lateral and multi-
25 lateral negotiations. 
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1 PARTICIPANT: Would you address the question 
2 of staged agreements versus fast-track extension?, 
3 MR. YEUTTER: The question is: Can we have 
~ ..... ~ staged agreements rather than an extension of the fast 
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track? 
That would, obviously, be a possibility but not 
as realistic, in my judgment, because of the necessary 
tradeoffs that are very likely between and among the 
I 9 different agreements. In other words, you have to have 
~ 
~ to self-balancing agreements that could stand on their own 
11 in order to put them in effect on that basis, or you 
12 have to have some way of evaluating the amount of debt 
13 that Canada had to the U.S. or vice versus, based upon 
1~ those earlier agreements. That adds an additional 
15 complexity to the negotiations that would not likely be 
16 very helpful. It seems to me that it is much better to 
17 do the entire exercise as one package. That would help 
18 in terms of congressional approvals here in the United 
19 States and, I suspect, in Canada, as well. 
20 We are just not likely to bring back a partial 
21 package and have that greeted with enthusiasm by the 
22 U.S. Congress. Congress is likely to want to see the full 
23 package, so the more likely result is to have an extension 
24 of time. 
25 MR. MACLAURY: During your remarks you mentioned 
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the phrase, "everything is on the table." 
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That has corne 
up a couple of times during our discussion today. Don 
I 
I 
MacDonald is the one who said that although that . 
sounded like a very reasonable proposition in the abstract} 
in fact, to some Canadian ears it means such things as 
cultural autonomy are likewise on the table. 
The question then comes: Aren't you offending 
some of the people in Canada who might be your strongest 
supporters by not circumscribing, to some extent, that 
sweeping statement that "everything is on· the table"? 
MR. YEUTTER: Well, I guess the question is 
whether Canadians are more concerned about preservation 
of their cultural autonomy or whether Americans are more 
concerned about preservation of their cultural autonomy. 
So, I am not sure how to evaluate that. Both 
of us have our cultures at stake. I guess I am prepared 
to have America's culture on the table and take the risk 
of having it be damaged by Canadian influence after a 
free trade arrangement. I hope that Canada is prepared 
to run that risk, too. 
I don't mean to be facetious about this. I 
recognize that that is a serious issue in Canada, but I 
would respond only to say that Canada, as a sovereign 
I 
nation, can decide what it wants to have on the negotiatinr 
table, and if Canada is determined to take things off the ' 
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table, whether it be cultural or anything else, it 
2 certainly has the sovereign right to do so. 
3 There is a price to be paid for beginning to 
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take things off the table, of course, because one's 
negotiating partners at that time will also take things 
off the table. This will happen, whether we are talking 
about a bi-lateral between u.s. and Canada or whether we 
are talking about the multi-lateral negotiations in 
I 9 
~ 
Geneva. It is just not realistic to expect that one 
:;t 10 E--o negotiating partner can take a lot of things off the 
11 table but that the other negotiating partner is going to 
12 leave everything on the table. 
13 So, if we want to gou that route, mutually, we 
1.e can do so, but that will clearly will shrink, then, the 
15 terms and parameters of the negotiation and will not move 
16 as far toward a free and open trading system between our 
17 two countries as would otherwise be the case. 
18 Canada will have to make that decision; we will 
19 make that decision here, too. 
20 I just believe that it is in the best interest 
21 of both countries to move as far as we can toward opening 
22 up to each other. I am not enthusiastic about proposals 
23 that are designed to shrink the negotiations even though 
2.e there may be very good reasons to do so. 
25 MR. WARREN: Mr. Chairman, we may have a little 
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problem with a confusion of terms here tonight. I think 
that most commercial negotiators would respond to what you 
have said about a person taking something off the table, 
meaning that there is a smaller area for negotiation and 
consequencies for the second part. 
But in a relationship which is of disparity in 
terms of popular culture, as presently exists between 
the smaller North American partner and the larger one 
and when the uniqueness of Canada, whatever that is, is 
so precious to us, I think it would be concerning us if 
we were to conclude that your option was that our worry 
about the ability to evolve as the northern North American 
partner was equated in your mind with withdrawing some 
commercial things from the table. That certainly would 
not be the way most Canadians would feel about their 
desire and their capacity to live with you as two separate 
entities in North America. 
MR. YEUTTER: Well, that is one of the difficul-
,ties, Jake, of dealing with abstract concepts. I am not 
sure what you mean, Jake, or what the government means 
when it says that cultural sovereignty cannot be a subject 
for negotiation. You have to be more specific for me to 
make an evaluation of what that means in the context of 
these negotiations. 
So, maybe we are going to have to leave that 
301 
for the negotiating table where people can be specific 
2 in outling just what that means in the context of this 
3 exercise. 
~ ...... 4 I happen to think Canadian culture is marvelous . 
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It is one of my favorite countries in all of the world, 
as some of you know. I honeymooned in Canada a good 
many years ago. So, I like Canadian culture and I 
certainly don't have as an objective in any way to 
I 9 adversely affect that culture. 
~ 
~ 10 Eo.. MR. WARREN: On that basis, I refuse to comment. 
11 MR. YEUTTER: Okay. Maybe we had better leave 
12 that one alone for the moment. 
13 PARTICIPANT: You said that Canadian culture 
I' 
14 
lS 
was at risk here and the American culture was at risk 
here. Could you tell us more specifically how a free I 
16 trade agreement might put American culture at risk 
17 through Canada? 
18 MR. YEUTTER: Well, in the same way that it 
19 would put Canadian culture at risk. I don't see this, 
20 for me, as being a major concern. But it obviously is 
21 a concern within Canada. As I said, I hope that our 
22 Canadian friends can articulate with greater specificity 
23 just what is encompassed in this term and in any constrain s 
24 that that may have on the negotiating process. 
25 I realize that this is an issue of great 
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sensitivity in Canada, and I have said that a couple of 
2 times here now this evening. We are going to be as 
3 reasonable as we can in this whole negotiation exercise, 
~ ...... 4 and if we can be as accommodative to these kinds of issues 
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because of their great sensitivity in Canada, we will 
try to do so. 
But it will have to be done in terms that are 
more specific. I am not terribly concerned about it from 
I 9 
~ 
the standpoint of the United States. As I was implying, 
~ 10 E- we are prepared to have the cultural aspects of America, 
II the United States of America on the table. I don't see 
12 those as being a part of this economic negotiation. 
13 Maybe from Canada's viewpoint it is an element 
14 of the negotiation, but we can't decide that tonight 
15 until someone is more specific about what is meant. 
16 MR. BEIGE: It is quite clear that both of our 
17 countries have very substantial current-account deficits 
18 at the present time. What I would like to have some 
19 sense from you, if you didn't mind giving it to the 
20 Canadians particularly, is the sense that the Adrninistra-
21 tion has about, one, what kind of progress you are looking 
22 for in 1987 on the aggregate U.S. trade deficit, and, 
23 two, how important you sense that is likely to be, that is 
24 progress on that trade deficit in terms of the congression 1 
25 attitude on trade issues, not only bi-laterally but 
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1 
multi-laterally, as well. 
2 
MR. YEUTTER: The question is what do I see on 
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the trade deficit front in the United States in the coming 
year and what effect will that have, particularly in terms 
of congressional relations, on bi-lateral issues of this 
nature. 
It is awfully dangerous to estimate changes in 
trade flows because they are subject to so many factors, 
I 9 
~ 
~ 10 
~ 
many of which are outside of the control of the gover~ment 
of the United States. They depend, to a considerable 
11 degree as you know, on what happens in western Europe and 
12 Japan and a lot of other places. 
13 But looking at it in 1987 terms, which is 
14 relatively short run, I rather subscribe to Fred 
15 Bergston's thesis that our trade deficit will shrink in 
16 
1987 and I believe is estimating something in the $30 to 
17 
$40 billion range. In my judgment that is not an 
18 
unreasonable expectation under the economic conditions 
19 
,which prevail today. I really believe that we are about 
20 
to move into a time frame of improvements in the trade 
21 
deficit, but we will still be fighting a very, very large 
22 
global deficit at the end of the year, even if that occurs 
23 
as you well know. We are starting from a base of a $170 
2 .. 
billion deficit right now. 
25 
What affect will that have on the Congress? 
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Well, clearly improvement will be beneficial psychological y 
2 everywhere. At least it will be helpful to have the 
3 trend going in the right direction, if that happens in 
~ ..... • 1987, and we hope it will . 
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But those who wish to take legislative action 
to counter it will obviously continue to use the argument 
that even though it is improving, it is still too large 
and we ought, therefore, to do something about it. 
I 9 There will be both opinions, of course, articula ed 
~ 
~ lO on Capitol Hill at great length in 1987. 
11 Insofar as the relationship of that isssue to 
12 this exercise, again, I wouldlmake the basic distinction 
13 between short run and long run. I don't believe that we 
14 can or should give much attention in this exercise,either 
15 to what global or bi-lateral trade deficits happen to be 
16 this year in Canada or in the United States or, for that 
17 matter, to what our exchange rate situation happens to be. 
18 Apparently there was some discussion today about 
19 the U.S.-Canada exchange rate. I have a hard time 
20 understanding why that should be of major concern now 
21 when, again, we are talking about the kind of trading 
22 regime we will have in the year 2000. 
23 So, we ought to try to keep all of that in 
24 perspective. I see the situation getting better, but I 
25 really believe we ought to isolate it from the discussion 
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of the merits of the free trade arrangement. 
PARTICIPANT (Ms): You mentioned that you would 
like to see such issues as services and intellectural 
property discussed . 
MR. YEUTTER: Yes. 
PARTICIPANT: Yet, we in Canada right'now are 
just starting to analyze the proposals for regulatory 
reform. This will take some time. Several observers 
have suggested that trade in services be dropped from the 
fast track. And yet again, tonight you suggested that 
yO.u do not like partial agreements. 
Do you think then that you would deal with such 
topics in broad strokes? 
MR. YEUTTER: Well, I would hope so. I happen 
to think that we ought to try to achieve positive results 
and significant results in all of these areas in this 
arrangement because they are important areas to both 
countries and to the world. We have an enormous amount of 
services trade between the united States and Canada today. 
a 
Hopefully there will bel lot more in the future. But we 
should want to do something in the way of a sound system, 
of establishing a sound system for the conduct of services 
trade between our two countries, if that kind of economic 
interchange is to expand in the future. Services are 
going, the whole area of services is likely to be a growth i 
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1 area internationally for both Canada and the United States 
2 which are sophisticated countries. 
3 As for intellectual property, there is the same 
~ ..... 4 kind of situation. I don't see how anyone can defend 
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international piracy in the intellectual property area 
anywhere. Therefore, it seems to me it is in the interest 
of both countries to support very strong and effective 
regimes in intellectual property. That is not the way 
I 9 to conduct business. Do we conduct business between 
~ 
~ 10 Canada and the United States or either of. our countries 
11 with the rest of the world on the basis of piracy of 
12 copyrights and patents? We ought to be much more mature 
13 as societies and political systems than that, so it seems 
14 to me that we should share a laudable goal of improving 
15 intellectual property regimes throughout the world. 
16 That is the second one. 
17 The third one is investment. It just seems to 
18 me that it is apparent that trade and investment go hand 
19 in hand, and it would seem incongruous to me that we would 
20 engage in negotiations of a trade regime that would be 
21 intended to open our two borders but then not do the same 
22 thing in an investment regime because businessmen don't 
23 separate trade from investment. They make trade-and-
24 investment decisions together. How do you say to a 
25 Canadian businessman or a U.S. businessman, "We are going 
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to open the border to your products, but you can't put 
2 investment in the other country"? They are two sides of 
3 the same coin, in many, many respects. 
~ ..... 4 So, we ought to try to make progress in the 
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investment area, as well. That is why I think that there 
are meritorious agruments to including them all. Can we 
get them all done by October I? I don't know; time will 
tell. 
I 
~ 
9 PARTICIPANT: When the negotiations began, I 
~ 10 assume there were some ideas about what could be accomplis ed 
11 over the next three years with a time schedule and the 
12 expectations of elements. 
13 I was in Toronto a couple of weeks ago, and ther 
14 was on the front page a long interview with Ambassador 
15 Niles in The Toronto Star in which he made the statement 
16 that when this trade issue was first raised in Washington, 
17 there was no one in Washington who had the slightest idea 
18 that this would be a big political issue in Canada. It is 
19 of enormous consequence in the Mulroney government. I 
20 assume that is a fair representation, but I wonder how 
21 we could misjudge the political sentiment so strongly in 
22 a country which is so important and so close to us. 
23 If that is the case, has it affected your 
24 negotiations, your approach to the schedule of the events? 
25 We have had a lot of speculation today about who is being 
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brought in when. 
2 MR. YEUTTER: Good question. The issue is this. 
3 What about the political sensitivities of this entire 
cJ 
~ .. exercise and has all of that had some impact on the 
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scheduling and the timetable and the process? 
My answer would be that it, obviously, is much 
more sensitive politically in Canada than it is in the 
United States. I find it difficult to comprehend why 
I 9 that is the case, but one must always deal with reality, 
2S 
~ 10 h rather than with what are perceptions of what should have 
11 been might be. It is the real world that we live in, 
12 not a fantasy world. 
13 So, one must recognize that this has become 
1 .. an issue for debate in Canada. My personal judgment, as 
15 an economist, is that this negotiation ought to have 
16 widespread support in Canada. As an economist, I am 
17 convinced that Canada will be by far the greater 
18 of the exercise. 
19 If that be perceived in Canada -- and I certainl 
20 haven't seen any persuasive evidence to suggest otherwise 
21 then there ought to be broad support for the Mulroney 
22 government which started the exercise and for the 
23 negotiating result when it is finally presented to the 
24 Canadian Parliament. I see this as a big winner for the 
25 government of Canada over the next half century. In that 
309 
regard, I will say to you that I returned a few weeks ago 
2 from our first annual consultations with the government of 
3 Israel on our free trade arrangement with Israel. Althoug 
~ 
'-i ~ clearly the -- one cannot go too far with analogies 
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between Israel and Canada because Canada is, obviously, 
a much larger trading partner and one that is right near 
by. There isn't any question about who has become the 
major beneficiary of the U.S.-Israel free trade arrange-
I 9 mente It means much more in terms of Israel trade moving 
25 :;: 10 E-< into the United States than vice versa. I happen to think 
11 that same result will prevail in Canada. 
12 But I am perfectly willing to accept that 
13 because, even though Canada may gain more, I happen to 
1~ believe the United States will gain a lot from the free 
15 trade arrangement. As long as both nations benefit, I 
16 am more than happy to have our Canadian friends benefit 
17 more than we do. 
18 Let me extend those comments a bit by saying 
19 that there has always been some concern that there isn't 
20 much public support within the United States, either,for 
21 this exercise, that people on this side of the border 
22 just haven't paid much attention. 
23 I would hope that folks in Canada won't pay much 
2~ attention to that phenomenon because I am convinced that 
25 if we have a sound agreement, then we can obtain the 
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approbation of that agreement within the united States, 
and we will have the public support to do so and the 
congressional support to do so. We will have to carry 
out our consultation processes effectively, and we clearly 
will have to have a substantive work product that jUstifie~ 
, 
support. But as long as we can do that -- and I believe 
we can do that on both sides -- in this negotiation, the 
support will generate and will prevail here in the u.s. 
I was talking to someone at the table here 
tonight and analogizing to the new Uruguay Round. About 
18 months ago, shortly after I came back to government, 
I heard those same comments about a new round of trade 
negotiations. When I visit Capitol Hill, many Members of 
Congress said to me, "We don't hear anything about the 
desirability of a new round of trade negotiations; nobody 
in the business world is talking about this; I don't hear 
from any constituents on this; why is the Administration 
out front pushing a new round of trade negotiations; 
forget iti nobody wants to do this." 
Well, now that we have had Punte del Este and 
the new round is underway, there is a lot of support for 
that negotiation that has come out of the woodwork. 
I happen to think that it was there all the time 
It just hadn't surfaced. I believe there is strong public 
support for U.S.-Canada free trade negotiation that has 
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been there all the time and will surface when the time is 
right. 
MR. HUDEC: Mr. Ambassador, if I recall correctly; 
I think that every speaker describing this Canadian I 
position today began, as first priority with Canada, with I 
changes in the United States anti-dumping and counter-
vailing duty laws. I take you at your word that those, 
. like everything else, are on the table. My question to 
you is: What do you think it would get in the way of a 
packaged concession structuring of this problem to get 
those issues from the table into a bill that STR might 
be willing to submit to the U.S. Congress? 
MR. YEUTTER: That is a hard question. The 
question is how do you handle the subject of counter-
vailing duty and anti-dumping laws. 
My judgment is that those issues will have to 
be handled very carefully by both countries, that there is 
just as much interest in those issues on the Canadian side 
of the border as on the U.S. side of the border. There is 
just as much of a challenge in getting a bill that will 
be approved by the Canadian Parliament as there is in 
getting a bill that will be approved by the U.S. Congress. 
i 
This is not an easy issue on either side because we are 
dealing with what are traditionally construed to be unfair 
trade practices. Nobody in Canada is going to be 
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enthusiastic about a negotiated result that will permit 
American firms to engage in unfair trade practices to 
penetrate the Canadian market, anymore than Americans 
will be enthusiastic about proposals that will permit 
Canadian firms to penetrate the U.S. market through un-
fair trade practices. 
So, the problem goes both ways. Canadian firms 
can subsidize to penetrate other markets; American firms 
can subsidize or can be subsidized in order to penetrate 
other markets. Canada is not the only country with export 
subsidies. We have some export subsidies, too, from time 
to time. We think we have fewer than most everybody else 
in the world, but, then, once in awhile we pull one out-
in the United States. There have been a few dumping cases 
filed against American companies in Canada and elsewhere. 
There have been some dumping cases filed against Canadian 
companies in the united States. 
It is an issue that has to be dealt with because 
no one is going to support the engaging in unfair trade 
practices with impunity, so we have to confront that 
question: How do we keep trade fair between our two nation,' 
so that that really doesn't become an issue or how do we , 
deal with it if it becomes unfair in this context? 
Well, Ambassador Warren and I talked about this 
at some length at the table, and I don't think we can get 
313 
into the creative sorts of things that might be done. That 
2 is something that we will have to work on between now and 
3 October 1. 
~ ...... 4 But there is no point in finishing this 
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negotiation with a result in that area that·will not fly 
in the u.s. Congress or in the Canadian Parliament. 
Nobody wants to be attacked by unfair trade practices. 
That is not a saleable proposition for the Canadian 
or Canadian business community i it is not a saleable 
proposition 'for the American public or the American 
11 community. 
12 So, we have to confront that issue head on and 
13 try to deal with it in a fair and reasonable way, as it 
14 applies on trade going both directions. 
15 That is an abstract answer, I am sorry to say; 
16 but there is just no way to be specific about that tonight 
17 because I don't think anybody has got the answers yet 
18 tonight. 
19 Bruce, sorry that we can't keep going, but it 
20 is great to see you all. Good luck to you. 
21 MR. MACLAURY: Thank you very much, Ambassador 
22 Yeutter, for some very candid and thoughtful comments. 
23 That completes a very long day of discussion on 
24 a very important issue. Thank you all for being with us. 
2S We hope that we have advanced the ball somewhat during 
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the day and we certainly have got some new issues on the 
2 table. 
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table." 
I will not use the phrase "everything is on the 
I 
I 
{The conference was concluded, 
I 
Thanks ever so much. Good night. 
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